LSE Continental Breakfast 5: Britain's financial obligations to the EU by Diessner, Sebastian
LSE	Continental	Breakfast	5:	Britain’s	financial
obligations	to	the	EU
How	much	does	Britain	owe	the	EU?	What	are	its	legal	obligations?	Is	the
European	Commission	right	to	demand	that	the	vexed	issue	of	Britain’s
‘divorce	bill’	is	settled	before	trade	talks	can	begin?	Britain’s	financial
obligations	to	the	EU	were	the	subject	of	the	fifth	Continental	Breakfast
discussion	at	the	LSE	–	held	under	Chatham	House	rules,	so	participants	can
speak	as	freely	as	they	wish.	Sebastian	Diessner	(LSE)	reports	on	the
discussion:	a	longer	report	with	full	references	is	available	here.
Among	all	the	thorny	issues	in	the	ongoing	negotiations	between	the	UK	and
the	EU,	the	settlement	of	Britain’s	residual	financial	obligation	to	the	EU
(often	referred	to	as	the	UK’s	‘divorce	bill’)	is	one	of	the	most	politically
difficult.	Unfortunately,	under	the	terms	of	the	European	Commission
negotiating	team’s	mandate,	it	is	one	of	the	issues	–	the	others	being	the	Irish
border	and	reciprocal	citizenship	rights	–	that	require	‘significant	progress’
before	negotiations	can	proceed	on	any	other	matters.
What	might	at	first	seem	a	technical	legal	matter	soon	turns	out	to	be	connected	to	broader	political	and
economic	questions.
The	legal	background
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The	legal	position	of	Britain’s	financial	obligations	is	a	mixture	of	international	law	and	provisions	in	the	European
treaties,	and	is	dependent	on	the	legal	implications	of	different	Brexit	scenarios.	In	terms	of	international	law	(i.e.
beyond	the	EU),	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	comes	to	the	fore:	Article	70	stipulates	the
consequences	of	the	termination	of	a	treaty.	However,	although	most	EU	member	states	are	a	signatory	to	the
Convention,	there	are	no	precedents	in	Europe	regarding	the	use	of	Article	70,	and	there	are	additional	doubts
about	whether	EU	member	states	could	take	recourse	to	the	provision	on	behalf	of	the	EU	as	a	whole	(which	is,
after	all,	a	separate	legal	entity).
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More	importantly,	Article	70	itself	specifies	that	these	consequences	do	not	come	into	play	if	“the	treaty	otherwise
provides	or	the	parties	otherwise	agree”,	which	seems	to	invoke	the	EU’s	own	provisions	for	the	termination	of
membership	–	i.e.	Article	50.	Michael	Waibel,	however,	notes	that	while	Article	50	may	allow	for	contracting	out	of
the	Vienna	Convention’s	procedural	steps	for	terminating	a	Treaty,	it	does	not	necessarily	enable	the
counterparties	to	contract	out	of	all	other	provisions	specified	in	the	Convention,	including	other	parts	of	Article
70.	So	the	Convention	may	not	be	off	the	table	entirely.
Beyond	this,	Article	50	contains	no	direct	reference	to	any	“right,	obligation	or	legal	situation”	of	the	parties
involved	(in	contrast	to	the	Vienna	Convention)	–	let	alone	makes	specific	mention	of	financial	obligations	–	which
may	be	taken	to	imply	that	there	is	no	particular	obligation	for	the	UK	to	pay.	However,	much	may	depend	on
whether	a	deal	can	be	reached.	Any	conceivable	no-deal	scenario	–	either	the	parties	not	being	able	to	agree	on
their	divorce,	transition	and	future	relationship	by	29	March	2019,	or	the	UK	walking	out	from	negotiations	before
that	date	–	would	most	certainly	entail	no	bill:	Article	50	simply	contains	no	provisions	for	this	scenario.	In
contrast,	both	of	the	potential	versions	of	a	Brexit	agreement	–	i.e.	an	Article	50	deal	with	or	without	transition	–
leave	room	for	discussion.	In	particular,	clause	2	specifies	that	“(…)	the	Union	shall	negotiate	and	conclude	an
agreement	with	that	State,	setting	out	the	arrangements	for	its	withdrawal”,	which	might	perhaps	be	interpreted	as
legally	equivalent	to	the	mention	of	“right,	obligation	or	legal	situation”,	thus	also	circumscribing	potential	financial
obligations	to	be	honoured	by	the	UK.
Of	course,	if	the	UK	simply	refused	to	pay,	whatever	legal	obligation	it	might	have,	there	is	no	mechanism	for
enforcement,	particularly	once	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	over	the	UK	comes	to
an	end.	(It	is	possible,	of	course,	that	the	CJEU’s	jurisdiction	could	be	extended	if	a	transitional	agreement	comes
into	force.)
The	EU’s	(political)	mandate	for	Brexit	negotiations
A	vital	issue	in	these	talks	is	the	possibility	of	negotiating	the	three	major	elements	of	a	Brexit	deal	–	divorce,
transition,	future	relationship	–	more	in	parallel	(or,	in	other	words,	the	extent	to	which	talks	on	transition	and
future	trade	deal	arrangements	can	be	brought	forward	to	earlier	stages	of	negotiations).	Article	50	makes	clear
reference	to	“taking	account	of	the	framework	for	its	future	relationship”,	and	some	argue	that	any	bridge	or
transition	to	a	certain	destination	can	only	be	envisaged	given	some	clarity	about	what	that	destination	will	look
like.
Doubts	were	expressed	about	whether	the	Commission’s	negotiation	positions	reflected	this	sufficiently.	More
generally,	given	a	fairly	short	two-year	window	of	opportunity	for	reaching	a	set	of	comprehensive	agreements,	its
mandate	may	not	be	practical.	This	raised	the	paradoxical	prospect	of	whether	it	would	be	possible	for	the	UK	to
take	the	European	Commission	to	the	CJEU	if	its	mandate	were	not	deemed	in	line	with	EU	Treaty	provisions.
Given	the	UK	government’s	objections	to	future	involvement	of	the	CJEU	in	UK	affairs,	however,	this	would	to	be
politically	awkward	(to	say	the	least).
Another	difficulty	in	the	negotiating	process	is	the	fact	that	the	Commission’s	mandate	is	conferred	by	the
European	Council,	and	any	views	on	its	appropriateness	and	the	flexibility	of	its	provisions	have	to	be	directed	to
the	governments	of	the	EU-27	and	not	the	Commission	and	its	chief	negotiator,	Michel	Barnier.
Finally,	an	additional	barrier	to	negotiating	the	interlocking	stages	of	withdrawal	in	parallel	are	the	important
distinctions	between	the	terms	of	their	completion	and	ultimate	ratification.	While	completing	an	Article	50	divorce
deal	will	‘only’	require	a	qualified	majority	of	72%	of	continuing	EU	member	states	(20	states)	that	represent	at
least	65%	of	the	EU-27’s	population,	a	deal	on	the	future	relationship	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	as	a	third
country	legally	constitutes	a	so-called	‘mixed	agreement’,	as	specified	in	Articles	207,	217	and	218	TFEU.	A
mixed	agreement	requires	not	only	the	unanimous	agreement	of	all	27	remaining	EU	member	states	and	the
consent	of	the	European	Parliament,	but	also	the	involvement	of	an	even	higher	number	of	national	and	regional
parliaments	(currently	at	38).
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Theresa	May	arguably	conceded	the	status	of	the	UK	as	a	third	country	and	the	need	for	a	mixed	agreement	in
her	Florence	speech,	suggesting	that	‘such	an	agreement	on	the	future	partnership	will	require	the	appropriate
legal	ratification,	which	would	take	time’.
Economic	and	other	aspects
The	supposedly	narrow	question	of	the	UK’s	financial	commitments	and	potential	obligations	to	the	EU	seems
impossible	to	disentangle	from	wider	issues	such	as	current	and	future	trade	opportunities,	regulations,	costs	and
prices.	The	focus	on	concrete,	tangible	sums	–	although	without	doubt	significant	and	worthy	of	reflection	and
contestation	–	may	mask	wider	debates	about	some	of	the	more	intangible	aspects	of	the	UK’s	divorce	and	new
relationship	with	the	union.	While	the	price	tags	attached	to	financial	obligations	or	future	savings	from	obsolete
EU	membership	fees	are	directly	measurable	and	visible,	the	prospective	‘costs	of	no	deal’	are	harder	to	pin
down	and	allude	to	with	confidence	in	political	debates	(not	least	given	recent	scepticism	about	the	accuracy	of
forecasts	or	even	the	value	of	expert	judgment	altogether).
Estimates	of	the	expected	bill	diverge	substantially	in	public	debates	and	across	political	circles	on	both	sides	of
the	Channel.	While	the	UK	currently	appears	to	be	willing	to	offer	€10bn	per	year	during	a	possible	transition
period	of	a	maximum	of	two	years,	many	in	the	UK	are	still	questioning	whether	and	under	what	circumstances	to
pay	at	all.	They	point	to	the	fact	that	membership	organisations	are	based	on	the	principle	that	members	are	only
obliged	to	pay	into	the	club	for	as	long	as	they	form	part	of	it.	By	analogy,	the	pensions	of	club	members,	for
example,	would	also	be	settled	on	a	pay-as-you-go	basis.	Certainly,	even	if	the	issue	of	whether	the	UK	should
be	paying	at	all	is	resolved	–	which	the	Florence	speech	seemed	to	settle	–	much	room	for	disagreement	about
the	overall	obligations	remains.	Some	estimate	the	obligations	at	€60bn	or	more	(leaving	aside	more	intricate
accounting	exercises	such	as	offsetting	the	divorce	bill	against	Britain’s	share	in	EU	assets).
Unresolved	questions	include	the	UK’s	called-up	capital	and	equity	share	in	the	European	Investment	Bank,
which	it	could	be	entitled	to	reclaim	once	it	ceases	to	be	a	member	of	the	EU.	Furthermore,	Britain	and	the	EU
may	want	to	agree	on	the	continued	participation	of	the	UK	in	a	number	of	joint	programmes	such	as	Erasmus,
which	is	open	to	non-EU	member	states.	Realistically	speaking,	the	final	bill	will	probably	range	somewhere
between	the	two	extremes.
The	one	thing	on	which	many	of	those	involved	would	agree	is	that	if	issues	are	interconnected	and	have	to	be
negotiated	under	a	tight	schedule,	a	neat	separation	and	sequencing	of	subjects	may	not	always	be	feasible.	The
requirement	to	make	sufficient	progress	on	certain	issues	before	anything	else	can	be	agreed	may	be	a	difficult
path	to	pursue.	And	indeed	progress	on	the	most	sensible	way	to	settle	Britain’s	Brexit	bills	remains	intractable.
This	post	represents	a	report	on	a	discussion,	and	not	the	views	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Sebastian	Diessner	is	a	PhD	candidate	in	political	economy	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
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